Florida Law Review
Volume 27

Issue 3

Article 11

March 1975

Jurisdictional Requirements of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman
Antitrust Acts: A Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause
John H. Moynahan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Moynahan, Jurisdictional Requirements of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Antitrust Acts: A
Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 27 Fla. L. Rev. 871 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Moynahan: Jurisdictional Requirements of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman An

1975]

CASE COMMENTS

state and local communities to prescribe locally acceptable termination procedures."" Ironically, when such direct action is taken, utilities will become
state actors under section 1983.
JAMES ALLEN MAINES

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE CLAYTON AND
ROBINSON-PATMAN ANTITRUST ACTS:
A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974).
Petitioner produced liquid asphalt and sold part of that production to
petitioner's wholly-owned subsidiaries, which manufactured and sold asphaltic
concrete. A portion of the liquid asphalt was also sold to respondents, competitors of the petitioner's subsidiaries in Southern California. The subsidiaries
and respondents both sold a substantial amount of asphaltic concrete used in
the construction of local segments of the interstate highway system. Neither
the subsidiaries nor the respondents sold any asphaltic concrete outside the
state of California.1 Respondents sued petitioner, alleging price-fixing and
geographical market allocation in violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, 2 tying arrangements in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act,3 illegal
88. Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1974 prohibiting utility termination on weekends or
holidays. See Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, pamphlet No. 1, at 25, to be codified
as 66 PA. STAT. §1172.1 (1974).
1. Because asphaltic concrete must be transported and poured at a high temperature, yet
has a relatively low value, it can be sold and delivered profitably only over short distances.
This fact discourages interstate sales. 95 S.Ct. 392, 395 (1974).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§, 2 (1970). The pertinent portions of these sections respectively provide
that "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal," and that "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States ...shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
3. 15 U.S.C. §14 (1970). A tying arrangement exists when a supplier agrees to sell his
products to the customer at some price below market value if the customer agrees to
purchase only the supplier's products in locations where there are competing suppliers. Id.
The statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares ... or
other commodities . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in'the goods, wares . . . or other commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
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acquisition of the subsidiaries in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,4 and
discriminatory pricing in violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.5 Relief sought included an injunction 6 and treble damages.7 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California 8 ordered full
discovery as to whether petitioner's subsidiaries were engaged "in commerce"
sufficiently to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the antitrust acts. 9 Finding the intrastate manufacture and use of asphaltic concrete neither was within
the flow of interstate commerce nor affected that flow, the court dismissed the
suit.' ° The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on
interlocutory appeal," holding that production of asphaltic concrete used in
the construction of interstate highways made the producers instrumentalities
of interstate commerce within the meaning of the acts. 12 Granting certiorari
only as to the jurisdictional requirements of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, 1 3 the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, petitioners,

to the extent of respondents' allegations, were not engaged in interstate commerce and were therefore not subject to the Clayton and Robinson-Patman
4

Acts.1

Since the constitutional debates, discussion of the types of commercial ac-

4. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1970). The statute provides: "No corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
... of another corporation engaged also in commerce where ... the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
5. 15 U.S.C. §15(e) (1970). The statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,
where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . .
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
6. 15 U.S.C. §4 (1970).
7. 15 U.S.c. §15 (1970).
8. The action was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California but was transferred to the Northern District, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1407 (1970), for coordinated pretrial proceedings as one of the Western Liquid Asphalt Cases.
In re Western Liquid Asphalt, 303 F. Supp. 1053 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
1969); In re Western Liquid Asphalt, 309 F. Supp. 157 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation 1970).
9. Literally, jurisdiction under the Sherman Act requires acts affecting interstate commerce. See note 2 supra. The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts apply only to persons
actually engaged in commerce. See notes 3-5 supra. The significance of this difference in
language is discussed in text accompanying note 38 infra.
10. 1972 Trade Cas. 1174,013 (N.D. Cal.). The court held that the liquid asphalt claims
did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act because the alleged restraints were not shown to affect adversely any interstate market. Thus, it also found the
claims did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman
Acts. 95 S. Ct. at 396 n.5.
11. Such an appeal was correctly taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1970).
12. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 204-06 (9th Cir. 1973).
13. 415 U.S. 988 (1974). See notes 9-10 supra for discussion of these requirements. The
lower court's holding as to the applicability of the Sherman Act was left undisturbed.
14. 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring; Douglas, Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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tivities subject to congressional regulation under the commerce clause 5 has
been spirited and partisan.16 Congress' power under this clause was first examined judicially in Gibbons v. Ogden,'7 in which the Court defined "among
the States" as commerce that "concerns" more than one state.18 Continuous
judicial interpretation through the next century reflected an expanding definition.- In United States v. Darby20 the labor conditions of workers producing
lumber eventually destined for interstate shipping were considered to exert a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce, thus permitting federal regulation
under the commerce clause." Three other cases dealing with the Fair Labor
Standards Act 22 held that employees who produced materials for and repaired
interstate routes were engaged in interstate commerce because the employees
23
were directly related to the functioning of an "instrumentality of commerce."
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8(3) provides that the Congress shall have power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
16. See Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 HARv. L. REv.
1335, 1337-48 (1934).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
18. Id. at 194-95.
19. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905), in which the Court
devised a "current of commerce" concept in a case involving alleged monopolistic practices in
the livestock market. Speaking for the majority, Justice Holmes stated: "[C]ommerce among
the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, draw[n] from the course
of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation
they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with
only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a
typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among
the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce." See also
Scope of the Commerce Clause as Evidenced in the Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, 31 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 374 (1964), which discusses this judicial expansion from a businessman's point of view.
20. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
21. "[T]his Court [has] many times held that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation through legislative action of activities intrastate
which have a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power
over it." Id. at 119-20 (emphasis added). In a suit to enjoin enforcement of the marketing
penalty imposed upon a farmer under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the substantial effect
test was applied successfully even to wheat grown by the farmer for his own consumption.
The Court found home-consumed wheat had a substantial effect on interstate commerce
because it reduced the amount of wheat the grower would buy and because it might enter
the marketplace if prices rose. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§201 et seq. (1970). The jurisdiction of the Act is stated in §202(a): "The
Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . .
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce."
23. Mitchell v. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955); Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S.
13 (1953); Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943). In Mitchell the Court stated:
"The test is whether the work is so directly and vitally related to the functioning of an
instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it,
rather than isolated, local activity." 349 U.S. at 429. See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), in which totally intrastate telephone solicitations were held to meet the
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement of §10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
16 U.S.C. §78j (1970), because the telephone is an instrumentality of commerce.
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The commerce power has been most liberally construed in civil rights litigation, where a mere demonstration of an underlying "rational basis" for protecting interstate commerce has been deemed sufficient to uphold far-reaching
federal legislation.

24

The commerce clause also constitutes the jurisdictional basis of the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Antitrust Acts.2 5 It is well established
that the Sherman Act may be utilized whenever the alleged activities meet the
"substantial effect" test of Darby 26 on the premise that Congress intended the
Sherman Act's applicability to be interpreted broadly.27 However, the jurisdictional meaning of "in commerce" as used in the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts 28 has not been defined with similar authority. The legislative history

of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates these two later acts were designed to
supplement and expand the Sherman Act as a congressional response to the
perceived threat that increasingly larger corporations might use their economic
power to destroy their smaller competitors. 29 In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co.3o the Court stated in dicta that an intrastate business may be subject to
the Robinson-Patman Act if it engages in a price war with financial support
from an interstate corporation31 In

United States v. Penn-Olin Co.32 and

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States33 the Court focused on "substantial effect"
language rather than on the "in commerce" phrase of the Clayton Act provisions 34 in finding the "in commerce" requirement to be satisfied by a " 'reasonable likelihood' of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant

24. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). This same test was used subsequently in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), in regard to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§201 et seq. (1970); and in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), upholding the commerce power as authority for the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§891 (1970). From Perez a cogent argument can be made that the courts should defer to
Congress' intent to protect the public at large when evaluating challenges to jurisdiction. See
Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of CongressionalPower Under
the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 187, 190-200 (1972).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§I et seq. (1970); see notes 2-5 supra.
26. See note 21 supra. Whether intra- or interstate, the activities need only substantially
affect interstate commerce to violate the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320,
321 (1967); United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949); Mandeville
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
27. See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944);
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1969).
28. See notes 3-5, 9 supra.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936). For example, the committee
stated: "It is the design and intent of this bill to strengthen existing anti-trust laws, prevent
unfair price discriminations, and preserve competition in interstate commerce." Id. at 17. See
also Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 120 (1954); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231 (1951).
30. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
31. Id. at 120.
32. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
33. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
34. The significant language reads: "[W]here the effect [of the alleged act may be substantially to lessen competition." See note 3 supra.
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market." 35 Both Penn-Olin and Brown Shoe involved interstate transactions,
and the lower courts have consistently analyzed the language and legislative
history of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts as requiring at least one
interstate transaction as a condition precedent to the application of these
Acts. 30 Most federal statutes aimed at protecting interstate commerce, including
the Sherman Act, have been broadly interpreted in order to allow the courts
to find jurisdiction. However, the language of the Sherman Act refers to any
person whose acts affect interstate commerce, whereas the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts refer to any person whose activities "in commerce" substantially lessen competition.Y The lower courts have strictly construed the
difference in statutory language to mean that satisfaction of the "in commerce" jurisdictional requirement of the latter two Acts requires at least one
of the alleged discriminatory sales to take place across state lines. 38
The instant case presented the first occasion for the United States Supreme
Court to consider the specific jurisdictional requirements inherent in the "in
commerce" phrase of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. On this point,
the Court essentially adopted the test used by the district court and other
lower courts in requiring at least one sale to cross state lines, reasoning that
Congress did not intend to expand the antitrust acts to reach basically intrastate activities.3 9 Because none of the transactions at issue crossed state lines,
the Court held that petitioner's subsidiaries were not engaged in interstate
commerce. The Court distinguished the Fair Labor Standards Act cases on
grounds that the statute involved was directed explicitly at workers producing
goods for commerce.40 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.41 was distinguished as

dealing with the extent of the commerce power rather than with jurisdictional
requirements and as actually involving one sale across state lines. 42 The Court
found that suppliers of materials to be used in the construction of "instrumentalities of commerce" [highways] were too far removed from commerce to
justify a finding that their activities were within interstate commerce. 43 Such
an expansion of the interstate commerce concept would have "no logical endpoint"44 and would surpass the "economic realities of interstate markets. '4 5
35. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964). See also Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
36. E.g., Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.
1973); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1973); Willard Dairy Corp. v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp.
33 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
37. See notes 2-5, 9 supra.
38. See, e.g., Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 766
(7th Cir. 1973).
39. 95 S. Ct. at 400-02.
40. Id. at 400.
41. 348 U.S. 115 (1954); see text accompanying note 31 supra.
42. 95 S. Ct. at 401 n.17. However, the same provision of the Robinson-Patman Act,
which was the basis of the claim in Moore, is the basis of the claim in the instant case. If
jurisdiction is coextensive with the reach of the commerce power, the Court's distinction of
the two is blurred. See Moore v. Meads Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1954).
43. 95 S. Ct. at 400.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
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The majority indicated that only a clear congressional intent to extend the law
to any practice adversely affecting interstate commerce could justify such a
judicial interpretation.46
The Court then directed its inquiry into the legislative intent underlying
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.47 The Court found the conference
committee had deliberately deleted a clause that would have prohibited price
discrimination whether occurring in interstate commerce or not. Since no congressional clarification had been expressed subsequently, it was concluded that
Congress had intended a narrow jurisdictional application of the Act. 41 In
concluding its analysis, the Court addressed respondents' argument that the
"substantially lessening" language of the Clayton Act49 implied that Act was as
broad as the Sherman ActA0 While the majority recognized some merit in the
argument, it stated that the import of this specific language was not at issue
because respondents had failed to show the alleged local activities adversely
46. Id. The Court feared that if it were required to apply the Antitrust Acts to all such
practices, jurisdictional requirements would only be a question of fact, not law. Cf. Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), in which the Court recognized "loan-sharking" as a class
of activity declared by Congress to harm interstate commerce, even though an individual act
is totally intrastate.
47. 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1970); see note 5 supra.
48. 95 S. Ct. at 400-02. The original language of the bill read: "It shall also be unlawful
for any person, whether in commerce or not, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (emphasis added). The emphasized phrase was
deleted by the conference committee. Even though the Court concluded the committee did
not intend the Act to extend to the utmost reach of the commerce power, the Court suggested
that the deletion may have been due to the committee's fear of overstepping the commerce
power. This suggestion appears, in fact, to be supported by the legislative history of the Act.
In its report to the floor, the House Committee on the Judiciary stated that it was desirable
to extend the "protections of this bill against the full evil of price discrimination, whether
immediately in interstate or intrastate commerce, wherever it is of such character as tends
directly to burden or affect interstate commerce." H.R. REP. No. 2887, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1936). The reach of the committee's intent is reflected in criticism leveled at the bill by
the Minority Report: "Incidentally, it is important to take note of the fact that this bill
would not only permit the Federal Trade Commission to pass upon allegations of lessened
competition between lines of commerce as heretofore but goes very much further and would
permit the Commission to interject itself into localized and purely intrastate competitive
situations in communities and even to deal with allegations that specific stores had been
injured or hampered in competing with their rivals." Id., pt. II, at 23. The Conference
Committee deleted the clause "whether in commerce or not" not because they meant to
restrict the extent of the Robinson-Patman Act, but because the committee thought that the
specific phrase might exceed Congress' commerce power as circumscribed in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-47 (1935). H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1936). Perhaps more significantly, the conference committee stated that it believed
the remaining language of the bill still extended Congress' commerce power as fully as
possible. Id. See also Evans, The Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. REV. 140,
152 (1937); Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASnTNcS L.J.
1245 (1971).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§14, 18 (1970), applies to persons "in commerce" in terms of prohibiting
certain activities that "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." See notes 3-4 supra. Note also the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13(a)
(1970), contains the same language. See note 5 supra.
50. 95 S. Ct. at 400-02.
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affected the interstate market, 61 and thus restricted their consideration to the
"in commerce" requirement.
In the instant decision the Court refused to expand the jurisdiction of the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts and enunciated a clear test for defining the
point at which an activity enters the flow of interstate commerce. This test requires that "at least one of the two transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination [must] cross a state line.",' 2 The Court hinted that the
Clayton Act might not require an activity that meets that test but declined to
decide the point.53 It concluded that the "in commerce" language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts must be read strictly until Congress manifests

a contrary intent.5 4
Though it does not conflict with any prior Supreme Court decisions 5 or
lower court decisions on the same point of law, 56 the instant holding considerably narrows the potential of antitrust enforcement when compared to
interpretations of "commerce" in other areas of the law. 57 The limits prescribed by the holding severely restrict the usefulness of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts by drawing a distinction between their jurisdictional requirements and the broad concept of the commerce power. In rejecting the
dicta of Moore,58 the Court has retreated from its liberal position apparent in
the Sherman Act cases and other areas of the law, of finding a broad range of
activities within the flow of interstate commerce. Despite the technically narrow language of the Clayton and.Robinson-Patman Acts, the legislative history
of those Acts evinces an intent on the part of Congress to supplement the
Sherman Act.5 9 While the Court has alleviated some uncertainty by establishing a clear jurisdictional standard for the Robinson-Patman Act and purportedly the Clayton Act, it has done so by limitation. The Court's hesitation
to read broadly the jurisdictional language of the Acts is inconsistent with its
other commerce clause cases.6 0 The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman
Act and the rationale of prior commerce cases, including Moore, suggest the
desirability of a policy aimed at preventing the use by large corporations of
their economic power to aggrandize themselves at the expense of smaller
competitors. 61 Activities that exert a "substantial effect" on interstate com51. Id. Though the dissenting justices believed jurisdiction should be granted because
petitioner's subsidiaries fell within interstate commerce as defined in Mitchell v. Vollmer &
Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955), and Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943), they
specifically attacked the majority's holding as to the Clayton Act claims. Speaking also for
Justice Brennan, Justice Douglas stated: "Mhe plaintiff need not prove, on a motion [to
dismiss] that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court, the merits of his case in order to obtain
an opportunity to try it." 95 S.Ct. at 408.
52. 95 S.Ct. at 401.
53. Id. at 402. Cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
54. 95.S. Ct. at 402.
55. 95 S.Ct. at 401 n.17.
56. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
57. See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying.text.
58. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
59. See note 48 supra.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 403-06 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 170 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).-.
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